f3f142fb9ed2f2c8363b5b2f9ab303a8015d01187d123b8b2197ce9a389eac91

This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act of
2026''.

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The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

3f9decdc7498325c7f33d0140642155ca7ac6de539b721a94926988ea6b8d3f7

e7f7d5e0c6dc7b2cb0b762bfaea529531937ce413201a04d90d4a542f9ebf1bb

International Cable Protection Committee
and other relevant international bodies to
safeguard United States interests.

31fa0a7107f1f4d03209c50d8539ed093ece2da6d97398d31e9b50b46e9ab1b8

TITLE I

- INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL

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d7c508d6db8ceb1c278fceee0f3acab7bb616819a7cf40a29366cac32df0b378

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critical undersea infrastructure.
EXPERTISE

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at the Department of State.
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

3c37a322cdd84591624b8f2a303d6be5cf3273fe9ff3430b15e7a2aaac260c70

TITLE II

-DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE

c21fbbd40d4bd0d8f441be2c377a51cecefbe0f8bea2c8e788b3d9d11944c68b

TITLE III

-SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION,

Government and private sector actors on
subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

9d67de7e484aa8a46a8fe8a1dfed144b3faff7b17dac024d2130c2527718f2aa

In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate
Federal agencies'' means the following:
(A) The Department of Commerce.
(B) The Department of Defense.
(C) The Department of Homeland Security.
(D) The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(E) The Department of State.
(F) The Federal Communications Commission.
(G) The Department of the Treasury.
(H) The Department of the Judiciary.
(I) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined
by the President.
(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical
undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea
telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy
infrastructure.
(5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency
committee'' means the entity established under section 301(b)
of this Act.
(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity''
means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual,
organization, or business involved in the operation,
maintenance, repair, or construction of critical subsea
infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure
owners.
(7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause
defective production, operation, or damage to critical
underseas infrastructure, including the integrity of data
transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy
infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,
including--
(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea
electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
equipment related to the support of offshore energy
production installations;
(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen
between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and
(C) associated landing stations and facilities.
(9) Subsea telecommunications infrastructure.--The term
``subsea telecommunications infrastructure'' means subsea
fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath,
or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications,
data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as
associated landing stations and facilities.
UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE

7b8e7fd7893e8e7ef2fd3e4d4f7a5a1de47bccad5771640eb0c382b41db85236

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a
growing threat to United States and allied security and
economic prosperity.
(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea
infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including--
(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea
telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard,
home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite
ground station on Earth;
(B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of
the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2
natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast
of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic
Sea;
(C) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main
island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan
Strait;
(D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the
Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline
spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the
reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables
connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;
(E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the
Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications
cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea
telecommunications cable in the central Baltic Sea;
(F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the
Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity
interconnection cable and nearby subsea
telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland ;
(G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the
Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable
connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of
Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;
(H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a
subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main
island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan
Strait;
(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central
Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and
(J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the
Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a
vessel named the Fitburg.
(3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic
Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network
to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among
private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.
(4) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an
EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and
deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for
Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in
the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated
surveillance approach.
(5) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN)
published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of
Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to ``build a
secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network'' and
``to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair,
maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables,
between ASEAN Member States''.
(6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United
States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its
commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and
Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for
digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea
cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and
encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.
Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote
resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure
across the Indo-Pacific region.

bfa60a9c991a6de619ec4f9d0504c0060d6c9f83dcac159f0fd4baee8cab1a52

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital
strategic and economic links between the United States and its
partners and allies;
(2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated
$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's
oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea;
and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via
undersea cables'';
(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected
sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea
infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East
Asia;
(4) the United States Government has an important role to
play in advancing United States interests in international
bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea
infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and
redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these
goals;
(5) the United States Government should play a more active
role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for
the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical
Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Call, the Critical
Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on
the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime
security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-
Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable
Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations
such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in
order to advance United States national security and economic
interests;
(6) the United States should lead efforts to promote the
deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure
networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen
preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies
and partners through enhanced information sharing and
coordination; and
(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other
associated private sector stakeholders carry significant
responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United
States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a
greater role.

db91d17b7a0e701f25b4aceff37d03b7f6c1e634745e344db9615c1091bd1868

INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD UNITED STATES
INTERESTS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government
engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable
Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security
and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea
infrastructure.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes the following:
(1) A description of how increased United States Government
engagement within the ICPC could support United States national
security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical
undersea infrastructure.
(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and
protecting United States national security interests within the
ICPC.
(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China
entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further
their strategic interests.
(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and
regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated,
consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications
infrastructure policies.
(5) A description of other international bodies relevant
for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States
should increase its diplomatic engagement.

9793d92979b577dd0ac6eec6c5cf7f1ef0b20f3260053c7bc4e1ab46f9d04dbe

INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.
(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of
sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical
support, security, or other services that facilitate or
enable an act of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that the President determines
knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured
transactions to support a vessel or entity described in
paragraph (1);
(D) provides port or logistics services or
facilities for technology upgrades or installation of
equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a
vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of
evading sanctions;
(E) provided documentation, registration, or
flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or
senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, a
report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the
sanctions.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a foreign person described in
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are or
come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry
documentation of an alien described in
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this
section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole
of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the
alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
United Nations and the United States, or other
applicable international obligations of the United
States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law
enforcement activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--A requirement to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property under this section shall not include the
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the
importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
(g) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive
the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the
waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the
waiver is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

bba2f53e3782d43b2c38dcaadcb2212a9c73fa5aa2f209893bc015ff6064eb79

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes the following:
(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting
period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and
maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russian Federation.
(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and
activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI)
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including--
(A) a description of GUGI operations and
capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure
surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including
recent activity trends and development of new weapons
systems;
(B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly
civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea
infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and
potential sabotage;
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the
ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and
equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those
sanctions; and
(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific
vessels, including vessel names and International
Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service
Identity numbers, and related equipment that are
suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and
probing of critical undersea infrastructure.
(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including--
(A) a description of GRU operations and
capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber
surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical
undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;
(B) a description of the use of Russian civilian
merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a
list of fishing and merchant vessel names and
International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile
Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in
surveillance or sabotage activities; and
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the
ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and
equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those
sanctions.
(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and
activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast
Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN
Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked
or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to
surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, including--
(A) a description of recent capability developments
related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea
infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and
littoral purposes; and
(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly
civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for
sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea
infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa,
Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.
(5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian
Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical
undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any current or planned operational coordination
against United States or allied and partner nation
targets;
(B) any joint research, development, testing, or
evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure
surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;
(C) any technology transfers or joint training
related to critical undersea infrastructure
surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and
(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced
technologies related to critical undersea
infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed
warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the
Russian Federation.
(6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year
in which the United States, or allies and partners of the
United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels,
either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia,
around critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any official United States Government response
to counter the anomalous behavior; and
(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies
and partners.
(7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities
are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United
States-invested cables.
(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report required
under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022,
through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports
required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for
the reporting period.
(c) Classification.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

a4f4b8b07b0854b11c6f13fda42bac1b341c4eae4f638ceed6d304ed53829a8f

INFRASTRUCTURE.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report
that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including
dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if
applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported
sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:
(1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.
(2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four
trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas
pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish
island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including--
(A) an assessment of the activities of Russian
military vessels, including those with undersea warfare
capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in
the months leading up to the incident;
(B) a description of any Russian civilian or
military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast
sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or
underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the
blast sites;
(C) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a
small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream
sabotage using the rental boat ``Andromeda'' in the
weather and sea conditions present at the time;
(D) an assessment of whether the Russian
Federation's documented practice of recruiting or
coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to
conduct sabotage operations on land targets is
applicable to a maritime context;
(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for
failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or
other Russian entities potentially faced due to the
throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1
pipeline in 2021;
(F) an assessment of the insurance implications for
Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and
Western financiers, depending on the identity of the
perpetrator;
(G) a description of the law enforcement
investigations by regional governments, the scope of
their investigations, and their outcomes;
(H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels
documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast
sites in the months leading up to or immediately after
the incident, including those with undersea
surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at
other suspected sabotage sites either before or after
the incident in question; and
(I) any information on potential attribution
received from allied or partner nation communications
through diplomatic or intelligence channels.
(3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of
Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
(4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to
subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and
Sweden and Finland and Estonia.
(5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the
Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the
central Baltic Sea.
(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable
and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of
Finland.
(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure
connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea,
and Japan, among other global democracies.
(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea
telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan
with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea
telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea
connecting Liepaja and Sventoji.
(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa
cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called
the Fitburg.

34544ba0c46b85d963519f46fb18a8610b53f7a8e429501c0ed8d60ce939d5d1

CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure
expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper
installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of
international subsea cables that have the potential to
undermine United States and foreign partner national security
interests;
(2) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide
technical, material, and other forms of support to
international partners to enhance the resilience of
international critical undersea infrastructure;
(3) the United States Government should enhance its
diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help
foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively
install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical
undersea infrastructure; and
(4) given the importance of critical undersea
infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and
prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing
capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea
energy infrastructure.
(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary of State
shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards--
(1) engaging with foreign countries to improve security and
reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance,
and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and
(2) working with allies and partners to support the
development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to
respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years,
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States
Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies
and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the
monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international
critical undersea infrastructure networks, including--
(1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create
barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain,
repair, and protect international critical undersea
infrastructure networks; and
(2) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result
of United States engagement with allies and partners.
EXPERTISE

0a6f430ee8a4dc4ea20a9b80f6b25dd4d9b4ea09cb0130da2dbb390c0f3b7603

AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall assign not fewer than
10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than 5
individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to
support the Department of State's interagency engagement on matters
related to critical undersea infrastructure protection, including--
(1) protection and resilience;
(2) coordination with United States allies and partners;
and
(3) United States engagement in international bodies that
cover critical undersea infrastructure.
(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may
not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring
requirement outlined in subsection (a).
(c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the
hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea Infrastructure
Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on how the United States Government
plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international
bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner
governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea
infrastructure sabotage.
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

06d401769196cdc5eb035a4ea94c3e8d19993037ccab69e7621d953b56e5723f

TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to a December 2024 Department of Homeland
Security white paper, ``There currently exists no forum in
which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can
effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify
and address shared challenges.''.
(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for
the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure,
damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and
emergency response are overseen by various government actors
through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal
departments and agencies.
(3) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with
United States economic and security interests and help industry
prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States
Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of
operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and
infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures,
defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive
cost analysis.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency
committee (referred to in this Act as the ``interagency committee'')
comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead
United States Government efforts to--
(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
telecommunications infrastructure;
(2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing
and permitting; and
(3) address other matters related to subsea
telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and
necessary by the President.
(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the interagency
committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal
Government's operational authorities for subsea telecommunications
infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include--
(1) an interagency concept of operations for partnering
with non-Federal entities, including subsea telecommunications
infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair
subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety
of crisis scenarios; and
(2) an interagency review and action plan to streamline
subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing, funding,
and permitting processes in order to promote United States
international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments
and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional
security and resilience assessments.
(d) Analysis of Subsea Telecommunications Infrastructure
Sabotage.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of
the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to
coordinate closely within the interagency process and with
subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders
to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage,
including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to--
(A) identify trends;
(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases
where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been
intentionally damaged by malicious actors;
(C) identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea
telecommunications infrastructure construction;
(D) identify Federal Government functions and
private sector engagement methods to support the
security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure;
and
(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce
damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure
systems.
(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) resourcing requirements;
(B) coordination with United States allies and
partners and relevant subsea telecommunications
infrastructure industry stakeholders; and
(C) the necessary technical expertise to make
attributions for subsea telecommunications
infrastructure sabotage.
(e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the required
interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit
to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the
interagency committee and United States Federal agencies
overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will
advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).

8af553863e45e9dde580091057df6f032dbffd279780705bf693184c720b471a

GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Public-Private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent with the
necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of
relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all
appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency
committee and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence
sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the
maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications
infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote--
(1) the timely sharing of classified information regarding
subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any
indications of potential sabotage held by members of the
interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess
the necessary security clearances;
(2) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, information
relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized
uses under this Act, in the possession of the interagency
committee that may be declassified and shared at an
unclassified level;
(3) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including controlled
unclassified, information regarding subsea telecommunications
infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage
held by members of the interagency committee or non-Federal
entities;
(4) the timely sharing between the interagency committee
and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of
information relating to indications of potential subsea
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses
under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-
Federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure
sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse
effects from such sabotage; and
(5) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and
performance metrics.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed under
subsection (b) shall--
(1) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the
capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications
infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the
appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent
with the protection of classified information;
(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes,
roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency
committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing,
including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific
information sharing and analysis entities; and
(3) require members of the interagency committee and other
appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or
defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls
to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such
information.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under
subsection (b); and
(2) not later than one year after submitting such
procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to
Congress a report on the implementation and execution of
information sharing with private sector actors in the previous
year pursuant to subsection (a).
Calendar No. 327
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3249
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the
security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea
fiber-optic cables.
_______________________________________________________________________
February 10, 2026
Reported with an amendment

fe62089c177cbbb2926ace69f0375e64d4e0c7eda775de2e8ee0ecf3c3bcbfbc

Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 — S. 3249

Other Sections

TITLE I

TITLE II

TITLE III

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