[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5682 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]
H.R.5682
One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
the third day of January, two thousand and six
An Act
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a
proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

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This title may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006''.

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TITLE I

-UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the
means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States
foreign policy;
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and
compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation
policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the
acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a
stable international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and
remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential
challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global
nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the
NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons
capabilities;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest
extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not States
Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear
technology they develop;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an
agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country
that has never been a State Party to the NPT if--
(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with
respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is
congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the
United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to
nonproliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and
implement substantially improved protections against the
proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the
means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would
further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give
greater political and material support to the achievement of
United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives,
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if
necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor
terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a
nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction
capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national
interest of the United States;
(9) the United States and India share common democratic values
and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement;
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United
States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people
of all countries;
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in
United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not
States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the
international nonproliferation regime;
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that
minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races
and maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation
regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG); and
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other
party if such exports are terminated under United States law.

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(a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United
States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear
weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the
NPT.
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to
``develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes'', as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as
being a right that applies only to the extent that it is consistent
with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including by
refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State Party that
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in
full compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards
obligations.
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for
Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related
Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those
guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG
decisionmaking.
(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning
consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and
recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely
and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations,
including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved
recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing
cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus
regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies
related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members
of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the
transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear
equipment, materials, or technology from other participating
governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear
transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to
this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.),
or any other United States law.
(b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the
production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by
India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and
implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and
India become parties.
(3) Secure India's--
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles of such Initiative;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria,
and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna
on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India's full and active participation in United
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction
and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the
capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the
means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in
South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian
nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States
except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required
under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2160 (f)).
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium
described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph
(2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile
material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol
to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any
export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement
for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements
set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such
section.
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the
Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear
facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.

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TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in
violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.

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A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be
effective if the President determines that India has detonated a
nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

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Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes
of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).

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Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of
1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted
into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in
appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-486)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) so much of the reports required under section 104 of
the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to verification or
compliance matters; and''.

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NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, is
authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program
to pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a
program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including
scientific research and development efforts, with an emphasis on
nuclear safeguards (in this section referred to as ``the program'').
(b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in consultation
with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
(c) National Academies Recommendations.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an
agreement with the National Academies to develop recommendations
for the implementation of the program.
(2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under
paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified
individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the
communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of--
(A) recommendations for research and related programs
designed to overcome existing technological barriers to nuclear
nonproliferation; and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded
under this section are achieving the goals of the activities
and programs.
(3) Public availability.--The recommendations and assessments
prepared under this subsection shall be made publicly available.
(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All United
States activities related to the program shall be consistent with
United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section
for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

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In this title:
(1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol
additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated
between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol
as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
(2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
(3) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or technology''
means material, equipment, or technology that may be used in
nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
(4) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the term
in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
(5) The term ``Indian person'' means--
(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of
India or has its principal place of business in India; and
(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
(6) The terms ``Missile Technology Control Regime'', ``MTCR'',
and ``MTCR adherent'' have the meanings given the terms in section
74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(7) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' means source
material, special nuclear material, production and utilization
facilities and any components thereof, and any other items or
materials that are determined to have significance for nuclear
explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)).
(8) The terms ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' and ``NPT''
mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into
force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(9) The terms ``Nuclear Suppliers Group'' and ``NSG'' refer to
a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least annually
since 1992, of Participating Governments that have promulgated and
agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (currently
IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and
Related Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
(10) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive
device'' mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous
release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear
material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be
released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(11) The term ``process'' includes the term ``reprocess''.
(12) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to the
separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products
from spent nuclear fuel.
(13) The term ``sensitive nuclear technology'' means any
information, including information incorporated in a production or
utilization facility or important component part thereof, that is
not available to the public and which is important to the design,
construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium
enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for
the production of heavy water.
(14) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the
term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2014(z)).
(15) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning
given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
(16) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity''
means research on, or development, design, manufacture,
construction, operation, or maintenance of--
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility,
conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant
for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable
material, or separate storage installation with respect to
which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the
relevant reactor, facility, plant, or installation that
contains source or special fissionable material; or
(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant
with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA
safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in
connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.

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This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional Protocol
Implementation Act''.

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TITLE II

-UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security of
the United States and its vital national interests.
(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical to
limiting such proliferation.
(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective,
each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and such
agreements must be honored and enforced.
(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards
system. This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors
with more information about, and broader access to, nuclear
activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon State
Parties.
(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and access
has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the form of
a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards agreements,
and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear
weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon
State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the
Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures,
consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with its
members, that protect the right of the United States to exclude the
application of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities with
direct national security significance or to locations or
information associated with such activities.
(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United
States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon
State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and thereby
strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system
and help reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of
direct and substantial benefit to the United States.
(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United
States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status
as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded
to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the
nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil
nuclear activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are
applied in the case of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.
(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion
contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United
States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any
declaration of any information with respect to, locations,
information, and activities of direct national security
significance to the United States.
(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to
the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the
United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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In this title:
(1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'',
when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional to
the Agreement between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at
Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, the
Committee on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary access''
means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as set forth in
Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
(4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has the
meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States
Code.
(5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set forth
in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
(6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the United
States'' means a United States district judge, or a United States
magistrate judge appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of
title 28, United States Code.
(8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic point
or area declared or identified by the United States or specified by
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon state
party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and ``non-nuclear-
weapon State Party'' have the meanings given such terms in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise
provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm,
association, trust, estate, public or private institution, any
State or any political subdivision thereof, or any political entity
within a State, any foreign government or nation or any agency,
instrumentality, or political subdivision of any such government or
nation, or other entity located in the United States.
(12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in
Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
(13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used as a
geographic reference, means the several States of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths,
territories, and possessions of the United States and includes all
places under the jurisdiction or control of the United States,
including--
(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and
(41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United
States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
(14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-area
environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in Article 18g.
of the Additional Protocol.

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If any provision of this title, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder
of this title, or the application of such provision to persons or
circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected thereby.
Subtitle A--General Provisions

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(a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement and carry
out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol and shall
designate through Executive order which executive agency or agencies of
the United States, which may include but are not limited to the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and enforce
regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions of the
Additional Protocol.
(b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency designated under
subsection (a) that does not currently possess the authority to conduct
site vulnerability assessments and related activities, the authority
provided in subsection (a) includes such authority.
(c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) does not
supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any Federal
department or agency already having such authority.
Subtitle B--Complementary Access

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(a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location in the
United States shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol
without the authorization of the United States Government in accordance
with the requirements of this title.
(b) Authority.--
(1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in the
United States subject to access under the Additional Protocol is
authorized in accordance with this title.
(2) United states representatives.--
(A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access to
a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the
Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in
the access.
(B) Number.--The number of designated United States
representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to
the minimum necessary.

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(a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a
location in the United States under the Additional Protocol shall be
conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
(b) Notice.--
(1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in subsection
(a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual written notice by
the United States Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or
agent in charge of the location to be subject to complementary
access.
(2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent as soon as
possible after the United States Government has received
notification that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may
be posted prominently at the location if the United States
Government is unable to provide actual written notice to such
owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
(3) Content of notice.--
(A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) shall
specify--
(i) the purpose for the complementary access;
(ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site,
or other location for the complementary access sought;
(iii) the activities that will be carried out during
the complementary access;
(iv) the time and date that the complementary access is
expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by
the complementary access; and
(v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
(4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be
provided each time that complementary access is sought by the IAEA.
(c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA and
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall
display appropriate identifying credentials to the owner, operator,
occupant, or agent in charge of the location before gaining entry in
connection with complementary access.
(d) Scope.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued under
section 223, and subject to the rights of the United States
Government under the Additional Protocol to limit complementary
access, complementary access to a location pursuant to this title
may extend to all activities specifically permitted for such
locations under Article 6 of the Additional Protocol.
(2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, no
inspection under this title shall extend to--
(A) financial data (other than production data);
(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
(C) pricing data;
(D) personnel data;
(E) patent data;
(F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or
occupational health and safety regulations; or
(G) research data.
(e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying out
their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access team and
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall
observe applicable environmental, health, safety, and security
regulations established at the location subject to complementary
access, including those for protection of controlled environments
within a facility and for personal safety.

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(a) In General.--
(1) Procedure.--
(A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an
appropriate official of the United States Government shall seek
or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or agent
in charge of a location prior to entering that location in
connection with complementary access pursuant to sections 221
and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of
the location may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.
(B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of
consent, the United States Government may seek an
administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States
under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of an
administrative search warrant shall be conducted ex parte,
unless otherwise requested by the United States Government.
(2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to a
location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol in
order to satisfy United States obligations under the Additional
Protocol when notice of two hours or less is required, the United
States Government may gain entry to such location in connection
with complementary access, to the extent such access is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
without obtaining either a warrant or consent.
(b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary Access.--
(1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For
complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant to the
Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of a warrant is
required, the United States Government shall first obtain an
administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States.
The United States Government shall provide to such judge all
appropriate information regarding the basis for the selection of
the facility, site, or other location to which complementary access
is sought.
(2) Content of affidavits for administrative search warrants.--
A judge of the United States shall promptly issue an administrative
search warrant authorizing the requested complementary access upon
an affidavit submitted by the United States Government--
(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
(B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other
location is subject to complementary access under the
Additional Protocol;
(C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access is
consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
(D) stating that the requested complementary access is in
accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
(E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's
complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall be
limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the
Additional Protocol;
(F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched
and seized;
(G) stating the earliest commencement and the anticipated
duration of the complementary access period, as well as the
expected times of day during which such complementary access
will take place; and
(H) stating that the location to which entry in connection
with complementary access is sought was selected either--
(i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of
specific evidence, to believe that information required to
be reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations
promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete,
and that the location to be accessed contains evidence
regarding that violation; or
(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative
plan based upon specific neutral criteria.
(3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph (2)
shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit under that
paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain the identities
of the representatives of the IAEA on the complementary access team
and the identities of the representatives or designees of the
United States Government required to display identifying
credentials under section 222(c).

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It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to
permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a complementary
access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such
access.
Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

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Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United
States Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United
States Code.
Subtitle D--Enforcement

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It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse--
(1) to establish or maintain any record required by any
regulation prescribed under this title;
(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to the
United States Government in accordance with any regulation
prescribed under this title; or
(3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the United
States Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed
under this title.

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(a) Civil.--
(1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in
accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 or
section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation. For the purposes
of this paragraph, each day during which a violation of section 224
continues shall constitute a separate violation of that section.
(2) Notice and hearing.--
(A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a person
under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency designated
under section 211(a) shall provide the person with notice of
the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the notice, the
person requests a hearing, the head of the designated executive
agency shall initiate a hearing on the violation.
(B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be
conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall be
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 554 of
title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so requested, the
order imposed by the head of the designated agency shall
constitute a final agency action.
(C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge
determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received,
that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224
or section 241, the administrative judge shall state the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on
such person an order described in paragraph (1).
(D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In
determining the amount of any civil penalty, the administrative
judge or the head of the designated agency shall take into
account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the
violation or violations and, with respect to the violator, the
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business,
any history of such violations, the degree of culpability, the
existence of an internal compliance program, and such other
matters as justice may require.
(E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this paragraph,
notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served upon
the person or persons subject to an order described in
paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
(i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of
the alleged violation or violations; and
(ii) specify the administrative and judicial remedies
available to the person or persons subject to the order,
including the availability of a hearing and subsequent
appeal.
(3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and order of
an administrative judge shall be the recommended decision and order
and shall be referred to the head of the designated executive
agency for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head
of the designated executive agency does not modify or vacate the
decision and order, it shall become a final agency action under
this subsection.
(4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a final
order may, within 30 days after the date the final order is issued,
file a petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit or in the Court of Appeals for the district in
which the violation occurred.
(5) Enforcement of final orders.--
(A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final
order issued against such person under this subsection and--
(i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial
review of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or
(ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph (4)
has entered a final judgment in favor of the designated
executive agency,
the head of the designated executive agency shall commence a
civil action to seek compliance with the final order in any
appropriate district court of the United States.
(B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and
appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to
review.
(C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final
order under this section shall include interest at currently
prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of the
60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date of such
final order, as the case may be.
(b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or section 241
may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be
imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined under title
18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.

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(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an
executive agency designated under section 211(a)--
(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or
section 241; or
(2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under
this title or the Additional Protocol.
(b) Civil Actions.--
(1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) may
be brought--
(A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph
(1) of such subsection, in the United States district court for
the judicial district in which any act, omission, or
transaction constituting a violation of section 224 or section
241 occurred or in which the defendant is found or transacts
business; or
(B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph
(2) of such subsection, in the United States district court for
the judicial district in which the defendant is found or
transacts business.
(2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process
shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may reside or
may be found.
Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

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ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the
Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area environmental
sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool, the President shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees.
(b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall contain--
(1) a description of the specific methods and sampling
techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be
employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be
conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and
(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and
sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct,
type, and nature of nuclear activities.

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ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the
United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling
proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the
United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the
President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling
that--
(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is
necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect
undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-
weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling will
not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or
information of direct national security significance; and
(3) the United States--
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving wide-area environmental
sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the
United States that involves the use of wide-area environmental
sampling.

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SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the
United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental
sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional
Protocol unless the President has determined and reported to the
appropriate congressional committees with respect to that proposed use
of environmental sampling that--
(1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to
detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations,
activities, or information of direct national security
significance; and
(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental sampling,
the United States--
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving location-specific environmental
sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the
United States that involves the use of location-specific
environmental sampling.

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As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase the
capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' shall not be construed
to encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist
the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of
a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of
such sampling; or
(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or
political support for such sampling in the territory of a non-
nuclear-weapon State Party.
Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

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(a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security
Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or Department
of Energy location, site, or facility of direct national security
significance shall be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under
the Additional Protocol.
(b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--No
information of direct national security significance regarding any
location, site, or facility associated with activities of the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy shall be provided
under the Additional Protocol.
(c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to
permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of
restricted data controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted
Data'' as defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2014(y)).
(d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees
of national security information and other classified information.

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(a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--No
national of a country designated by the Secretary of State under
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as
a government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be
permitted access to the United States to carry out an inspection
activity under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards
agreement.
(b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA
inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States
Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or
activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol.
(c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President shall
conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not
less than every 5 years to ensure that information of direct national
security significance remains protected at all sites, locations,
facilities, and activities in the United States that are subject to
IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
Subtitle G--Reports

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Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United States
declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the President
shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, locations, facilities,
and activities in the United States that the President intends to
declare to the IAEA, and a report thereon.

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Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any revisions
to the United States declaration submitted under the Additional
Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of any sites,
locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the
President intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a
report thereon.

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The reports required under section 271 and section 272 shall
present the reasons for each site, location, facility, and activity
being declared or being removed from the declaration list and shall
certify that--
(1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the
list has been examined by each agency with national security
equities with respect to such site, location, facility, or
activity; and
(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that
information of direct national security significance will not be
compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in
connection with an IAEA inspection.

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PROTOCOLS.
Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on--
(1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve the
adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements
signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
(2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the
United States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective
implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards
agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the
verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA
obligations, with a plan for providing any needed additional
funding.

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The President shall notify Congress of any notifications issued by
the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional
Protocol.
Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

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There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this title.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.

5c6d4ff616840e99a9b11490c38f79da8a599af420166b0bfb0a73a4cb91399e

Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006

Other Sections

TITLE I

TITLE II

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